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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study the effect of flexibility on both wages and the likelihood of 
work stabilisation, by focusing on flexibility when entering the labour market and on 
periods of career interruption. Our main goal is to evaluate how having entered the 
labour market with fixed-term contracts or having experienced periods of interruption of 
work can affect the likelihood of being given a permanent contract and the level of 
wages received in subsequent jobs. Unlike other works in the existing literature, this 
study deals with female and male workers separately.  
The analysis is carried out using a dataset put together by the Istituto per lo 
Sviluppo della Formazione Professionale dei Lavoratori – ISFOL (Institute for the 
Development of the Professional Training of Workers) based on a sample of Italian 
workers. The dataset is representative of the Italian population and contains detailed 
information on work experience previous to workers’ present occupation with details on 
types of contracts and causes of career interruptions.  
In the first part of the paper, we examine density functions of monthly and hourly 
wages relative to contractual characteristics of first jobs and the number of job changes 
and work interruptions. In the second part of the paper, we estimate separate earnings 
functions for the sample of men and women with full-time permanent contracts. We 
correct for selection in full-time work by estimating a first-stage equation of the 
probability to have a permanent job and including the Mill’s ratio in the second-stage 
wage function. Estimates show that flexibility affects men and women differently, both 
in terms of levels of wages, and the likelihood of accessing permanent jobs. Some 
differences also emerge with regard to the causes of career interruptions. 
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Introduction 
 
In this article we present the results of a study on the relationship between work 
flexibility, the likelihood of gaining a permanent contract and earning power in Italy, 
focusing on the effect that flexibility on entering the labour market and during 
individuals’ careers may have on their professional achievements, not only in terms of 
being granted a permanent working position – with particular regard to flexibility 
among those entering the labour market – but also in terms of earning power, especially 
in cases of ongoing career flexibility. The analysis sets out to address the theme by 
examining gender specificities; thus, both the descriptive and the econometric analyses 
are performed taking gender into consideration. Flexibility will be evaluated by 
considering both the nature of the contracts of first occupations, and the overall working 
career of the individual, i.e. including periods of career breaks. 
The present work attempts to provide a long-term analysis of the incidence of 
flexibility in Italy, both in terms of the ability of workers to stabilise, and its effect on 
their earning capacity once they have been granted a permanent contract. Over the last 
decade, the Italian labour market has been rendered extremely flexible: a phenomenon 
which has been felt particularly by new workers and women, bringing about a profound 
segmentation of the labour market. The underlying question that we pose here is 
whether the Italian labour market attributes a different “value” to the work experience 
gained by men and women according to flexible models of labour organisation. 
Therefore, an analysis will be made of the possible relationships between the wage 
distribution of those workers who have been given permanent posts (lifelong 
employment contracts) and aspects of flexibility that the same workers have 
experienced throughout their careers: career interruptions, moving companies, and 
flexible working contracts on their first entering the labour market. Following the 
descriptive analysis, the results of an econometric study will be presented, estimating 
the incidence of flexibility when experienced over the course of a working career on the 
likelihood of being given a permanent post, and on the wages of those who are granted a 
lifelong contract. 
The analysis is made using data from a study undertaken by the Italian Ministry of 
Labour and Welfare and carried out by the Italian Institute for Vocational Training (the 
“Istituto per lo Sviluppo della Formazione professionale dei Lavoratori”, or ISFOL) in 
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2006 as part of a research project on wage differences between genders. This study 
includes a special section examining aspects of work flexibility, containing information 
both on the type of work contract given at the start of the working career, as well as to 
career interruptions and their relative causes. 
The work is articulated as follows: after a brief overview of the current literature on 
the theme, (Section 1), a number of descriptive reflections will be presented on the 
wage distribution patterns of men and women pursuing different careers (Sections 2 and 
3) as well as an empirical analysis of a selection model for permanent posts and the 
earning capacity of men and women whose working positions have been stabilised. 
(Section 4). This is followed by conclusive considerations. 
 
 
1. From flexibility to stabilisation: the literature on the effects of flexibility on the 
labour market 
 
The literature that has dealt with the effects of the flexibilisation of the labour 
market has concentrated in particular on evaluating the relationship between the 
persistence of fixed-term work and the likelihood of stabilisation, showing how (in 
general) a series of fixed-term contracts tends to lead to greater difficulties in finding a 
permanent post. However, there are various ways in which temporary contracts may in 
the long run lead to difficulties in career stabilisation. In fact, as highlighted by 
Gagliarducci (2005), the problem of shifting from temporary to permanent employment 
may depend not so much on the persistence of fixed-term contracts as on the presence 
of career interruptions. On the other hand, the difficulty that fixed-term workers come 
across in finding a lasting (lifelong) position may be explained by the insufficient 
investment made in specific human capital during their time as fixed-term workers 
(Booth et al., 2002), or by the discouraging effect that temporary work seems to have on 
workers, channelling their energies into job hunting due to a “locking-in” effect (Van 
Ours, 2004). 
However, more recent literature also tends to suggest that temporary work 
facilitates progress in the work market, reducing the periods spent job hunting and 
leading to longer-term job attachment. Temporary work thus appears to play a role of 
reducing periods of unemployment, even though it does not alter or facilitate the 
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transition to permanent employment. For example Zijl et al. (2004), when studying the 
transition rates from unemployment to temporary work, from temporary to permanent 
work, and from unemployment directly to permanent posts, note that the rate of 
transition to permanent work increases in the wake of temporary work contracts. The 
authors attribute this fact to the accumulation of human capital which potentially takes 
place while working under a fixed-term contract, and which thus makes it easier for 
such workers (compared to the unemployed) to find a permanent position in the labour 
market. Furthermore, the authors conclude that temporary work reduces the length of 
unemployment periods. In a counterfactual situation, those without temporary work 
have fewer chances of finding permanent work than those in temporary employment. 
Addison & Surfield (2009), when evaluating the chances of being employed both 
for workers in non-standard employment relationships and for the jobless, find that 
those who started with a fixed-term work contract, in the very short term – one or two 
years from the end of the contract – have a greater likelihood of being offered work than 
those who were previously unemployed. However, this advantage tails off over a period 
of four years. 
The great flexibilisation of a number of different European labour markets has 
provided the input for several works evaluating the effectiveness of temporary 
employment agencies and, hence, of the kinds of employment they offer. García-Pérez 
& Muñoz-Bullón (2005), in their study of the careers of Spanish workers making use of 
Temporary Help Agencies (THAs) and their upgrading (meant in terms of the 
likelihood of them moving towards permanent employment jobs that call for higher 
levels of skill), came up with different results according to the skills of the workers 
themselves: the temporary work offered by the Spanish THAs seems to be a good tool 
for fostering the stabilisation of high-skilled workers, as those that go through the THAs 
have better chances of then accessing permanent posts. Nevertheless, this is not the case 
for the low-skilled, for whom the opposite is true, or for the medium-skilled. In the case 
of the latter, however, the THAs play a different role, making it less likely for those 
workers who go through the agencies to then shift towards jobs with lower skill 
requirements, when compared to regular workers. A study similar to the Spanish one 
was carried out by Ichino et al. (2005) on Italian data from Temporary Work Agencies 
(TWAs). The Italian market, as mentioned above, has been characterised by a 
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flexibilisation trend ever since the ’90s, which has also led to the liberalisation of the 
management of temporary work through authorised agencies (the TWAs). The analysis 
carried out in two Italian regions (Tuscany and Sicily) shows how passing through 
TWAs has a positive effect on the likelihood of finding a permanent job in the 
following 18 months, yet that such an effect is variable, and that it is greater for 
individuals over 30 who have a university degree. 
Van Ours (2004), who studied the labour market in Slovakia (where in the mid ‘90s 
the length of short-term subsidised work contracts was lengthened), identifies different 
effects on the basis of the contract length. The results he obtained show that short-term 
subsidised jobs have a positive effect on the rate at which people find regular jobs; 
however, as the ex-ante duration of these subsidised jobs increases, the positive effects 
diminish and locking-in effects are found. 
As far as the differences in the effects of temporary work between men and women 
are concerned, the analyses are few and far between. Of those that there are, the work of 
Booth et al. (2002) is the most significant in terms of general results. Booth et al. find 
that the transition from fixed-term to permanent work differs for men and women. In 
particular, fixed-term contracts are a stepping stone for men and not for women, while 
fixed-term contracts in the public and non-profit sectors negatively affect the likelihood 
of women entering permanent work. On the other hand, the wage penalty associated 
with the experience of one fixed-term contract is significant only for men, and is equal 
to a 4.6% reduction compared to workers who maintained permanent jobs over the same 
period. 
 
 
2. Flexible careers and wage distribution 
 
In this section we present a descriptive analysis designed to verify whether more 
flexible working careers may in the long run entail penalisation in terms of pay, and if 
so, whether that happens differently for men and women. The analysis was carried out 
on workers who, at the time of the interview, declared that they were working as 
employees with permanent work contracts. By the expression “more flexible working 
careers”, we mean to identify the professional careers of workers who have changed 
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employer or activity many times and/or who have spent long periods of time without 
work and without receiving their normal pay. The dataset on which our analysis is based 
is highly detailed, especially in the section relative to workers’ career histories.1 The 
information gathered is particularly detailed with reference to contract types adopted for 
workers’ first occupation; this is due to the wide-reaching reform of the labour market 
that was implemented in Italy in the early ‘90s and which introduced various forms of 
“non-standard” contracts to the labour market. Therefore the information available 
varies according to whether the individual has been working for more or less than 15 
years. In fact in the latter case, there is a wide range of possible contracts for those 
entering the labour market; however, we shall examine this in the next Section.  
As mentioned above, the dataset includes information on the number of working 
periods undertaken with different employers; the variable available is continuous and 
contains the declared number of changes of occupation. For the purposes of the 
descriptive analysis, however, we grouped the data together into three categories: fewer 
than three changes of job, from three to five, and six or more. Furthermore, we also 
know whether the worker has been without work for long spells as well as the causes of 
such interruptions. Interviewees were asked the following question: “With reference to 
your working life, have there been significant periods of time (at least three months) in 
which you did not work and did not receive your normal wages?” On answering 
affirmatively, the interviewee was asked to give details of the causes of such 
interruptions, which we grouped under the following headings: Wage Supplementation 
Fund, WSF (in Italian this is known as Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, or CIG)2, 
Mobility,3 unemployment, illness, maternity leave, for childcare reasons, in order to 
look after elderly or other family members, for study/training, other reasons.  
The data on earnings that we use for the analyses are those relating to the net wage 
paid the month prior to the interview. We turned this datum into an hourly figure, 
                                                 
1 The data come from a survey undertaken by the Italian Ministry of Labour and Welfare and carried out 
by the ISFOL (Italian Institute for Vocational Training), www.isfol.it. The survey was based on telephone 
interviews held in 2007 on a sample of Italian workers aged between 15 and 64.  
2 The CIG is an institutional form of flexibility through which companies in difficulty may suspend their 
workers for medium/long periods of time, providing them with a replacement wage, albeit lower than that 
received normally. The CIG is divided into “ordinary” and “special” regime. 
3 Mobility (in Italian, Mobilità) is another institutional form of flexibility thanks to which companies may 
dismiss workers because of reductions in staff requirements, the transformation of the company’s activity 
or its closure, guaranteeing the worker a replacement wage, albeit lower than that received normally. 
Mobility allowance may be granted to workers enrolled at Employment Offices (“Centri per l’Impiego”) 
who have served at least 12 months in the company in question.  
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dividing it by the average number of hours in a working week and considering the 
number of working weeks in a month to be 4.33.4 
 
Let us now comment on the charts below, in which we represent the distribution 
patterns of monthly and hourly wages divided by gender and career mobility (Figure 1 
and Figure A1 in the Appendix) and the career interruptions for significant periods of 
time (Figure 2).  
Figure 1 shows the monthly and hourly wage patterns for men and women working 
with permanent and full-time contracts, on the basis of the degree of career mobility 
declared. Greater inter-company mobility appears to penalise women to a greater extent: 
the higher the number of job changes, the more the distribution of monthly wages shifts 
leftwards. Among men, on the other hand, a higher number of job changes leads to a 
greater concentration in the trend distribution, yet without there being a leftward shift of 
the salary distribution. The distribution patterns seem to show that the market attributes 
a different significance to career mobility – also in terms of pay levels – on the basis of 
gender While in the case of female workers greater mobility implies a greater likelihood 
of lower pay, mobility does not seem to substantially affect the distribution of men’s 
wages, which tend to gravitate around a modal value independent of the number of job 
changes observed. 
The differences in pay models between men and women with regard to career 
mobility appear to be confirmed when we examine hourly wages. Women’s wage rates 
are clearly more exposed to the mobility factor: as the number of changes of employer 
rises, not only does the hourly pay distribution shift towards lower levels, but it also 
shows a substantial decrease in density in correspondence to pay levels above the modal 
value (the curve to the right of the distribution trend drops off considerably). Male 
hourly wage distribution, on the other hand, appears to be not particularly sensitive to 
the number of job changes; the only difference that may be perceived between the 
distribution levels is a thinning out on the right-hand end of the bell, seen with the rise 
of mobility, yet which is counterbalanced by a rise in density at the right-hand end.  
                                                 
4 This is the procedure generally adopted to calculate hourly wages when there is no specific information 
on the actual amount of time spent in service. 
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Figure 1. Kernel densities of monthly and hourly wages by sex and number of job changes. Permanent workers 
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The distribution patterns in fact appear very different if they are taken apart by age 
group, as shown in figure A1 in the Appendix, with regard exclusively to hourly wages. 
The comparison between men and women in the youngest age group – between 15 and 
29 years of age – is particularly interesting: the models of pay taking career mobility 
into account may here be seen as notably different between the two sexes. We note that 
the pay of very young women does not undergo any particular variation with the rise of 
the number of working experiences, and when the number of these becomes particularly 
high (“six or more”), hourly pay is cut off under the ten Euro per hour mark. Yet there 
is a substantially different pattern for young men, who show a notable rightward shift in 
the distribution of hourly pay with the rise of their career mobility up to five company 
changes, and a massive dispersion of pay distribution with a mobility level of or over 
six company changes; in such cases, wage rates may vary up to 25/30 Euros per hour (in 
terms of net pay). Therefore, in the case of men under 30, a high degree of mobility is 
synonymous with a great accumulation of skills and human capital, which the market 
rewards generously. 
The distribution patterns among the central age groups, those between 30 and 44 
years old, show a consolidation of the general distribution model in the sample: among 
women there is a tendency towards the pay model that penalises the number of work 
experiences to date; among men, on the other hand, a pay model emerges in which the 
number of company changes does not substantially modify the wage distribution, with 
the exception of the narrowing of the distribution bell on the right-hand side, 
compensated by a higher density registered in correspondence with the modal value. 
The pay pattern which emerges from the central age group is basically repeated in 
the case of men and women of between 45 and 65 years of age. In this case, however, 
we may note a greater level of penalisation for those men with highly mobile careers. 
 
Let us now move on to the description of the pay distribution patterns by 
comparing continuous and interrupted careers. The analysis of the distribution patterns 
of monthly pay (Figure 2) shows a greater concentration of the wages of female workers 
with interrupted careers in the lower part of the distribution, compared to those of 
women with an uninterrupted working profile. On the other hand, male workers’ 
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monthly pay (in the case of an interrupted career) appears to be more heavily 
concentrated on the modal value, going some way to compensating for the lesser 
density registered on the right-hand side of the distribution pattern. However, once the 
monthly data are broken down into working weeks and hours, there are no particular 
distributional differences between those women with interrupted careers and those with 
continuous ones; in fact, the two distribution patterns appear to be almost exactly the 
same. Thus in hourly terms, women’s pay does not appear to be influenced by the 
interruption of their working activity. However, this is not true for the male sample; the 
pay of those men with interruptions to their working lives is to be found at levels lower 
than those of their colleagues who have enjoyed a continuous career. 
This gender difference will be examined further in Section 4, where the results will 
be presented of the overall estimates for both men and women of their likelihood of 
accessing permanent and full-time5 work, and of their earning functions corrected for 
selection into permanent work.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Part-time work is excluded here so as to avoid gender-based distortion in the distribution of the sample 
between full and part-time work.  
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Figure 2. Kernel densities of monthly and hourly wages by sex conditioned on interrupted and not interrupted careers 
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3. The impact of the type of contract of people’s first job on their current pay 
 
Our description continues with an examination of the relationship between the type 
of contract of people’s first job and the distribution of workers’ pay with permanent 
full-time jobs. The idea that led us to move in this direction is in keeping with that 
proposed in other studies: pay progressions may also be influenced by the contract 
positioning given on entering the labour market.6 As discussed in Section 1, the 
accumulation of human capital may be sacrificed during periods of fixed-term work 
and, as a consequence, the work experience acquired during such professional periods 
may prove less significant in terms of pay progression than non-temporary work. 
The information available from the dataset on contract positioning in people’s first 
experience of work is very detailed; the questionnaire given to the workers contains 
different questions depending on whether they began working more or less than 15 
years ago. This distinction is due to the fact that the types of employment contract 
changed considerably at the beginning of the ‘90s, a time in which the Italian labour 
market was heavily flexibilised with the initial introduction of the fixed-term contract 
and, at a later date, of various forms of temporary contracts based on subordinate 
employment, and lastly project-based contracts. For the sample of workers with less 
than 15 years of experience, we know that the type of contract given for their first 
occupation was one of the following: a permanent employee contract, a fixed-term 
employee contract, a para-subordinate work contract7 or a self-employment position. 
For the sample of workers with more than 15 years of experience, on the other hand, a 
distinction is made merely between permanent contracts and self-employment. It is for 
this reason that we present separate descriptive analyses for the two categories. 
In Table 6 we show the distribution percentages of the sample by gender and by 
type of contract at the start of the career, with reference only to workers with less than 
15 years of experience. The data show a strong tendency among the female sample 
towards fixed-term types of contract: 56% of women started their working careers with 
                                                 
6 By first work experience, we mean the experience deemed by the interviewee to be the first significant 
occupation, not carried out during the period of study. 
7 Para-subordinate work lies halfway between that of the company employee and self-employment; the 
worker must answer to an employer in the fulfilment of his/her contract duties, but does not have the 
rights to all the contractual protection and guarantees typically enjoyed by a company employee (also 
with regard to paid holidays, sick leave and social protection). 
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fixed-term contracts, compared to 49% of men; the male sample, on the other hand, 
shows higher numbers of para-subordinate contracts and self-employment.  
 
Table 1. Type of contract given for first significant occupation. Men and women 
with less than 15 years of work experience. 
 Contract Types (% by gender) 
 No 
contract 
Permanent 
job 
Fixed-term 
job 
Para-
subordinate 
Freelance 
Men 2.9 41.61 49.19 5.27 1.02 
Women 1.59 37.27 56.26 4.54 0.34 
 
In Figures 3 and 4 we show the distribution patterns of workers’ pay in relation to 
the type of contract granted on entering the labour market, among those with less than 
15 years of work experience (Figure 3) and those with at least 15 years (figure 4). Both 
figures refer only to workers who at the time of the interview were working as company 
employees.  
In the case of the sample with greater working experience (Figure 4), about whom 
we only know whether the first experience was as a self-employed or permanent 
worker, the type of contract of their first occupation does not appear to substantially 
affect their current levels of pay in hourly terms. Men and women, however, appear to 
follow different models of salary dispersion. Men’s pay patterns appear almost to 
overlap: the modal value is the same (albeit with a different density), the tails coincide 
(with the exception of the far right-hand side) and the dispersion is substantially the 
same. Basically, over the long term, male workers seem to converge towards a pay 
distribution not influenced by the type of contract with which they start their career. The 
data give slightly different results for women, as after a considerable number of years of 
experience, their pay distribution appears to be divided between those who entered the 
labour market as self-employed workers and those who started as employees. The 
distribution pattern of the pay of the former is inferior to that of the latter and shows 
greater dispersion. This last result may be felt more strongly if we observe the samples 
of workers with less work experience (Figure 3), for whom there is an extra contract 
category: that of para-subordinate work, which constitutes an intermediate contract 
situation between self-employment and that of the company employee. 
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Figure3. Kernel densities of monthly and hourly wages by sex and type of contract when entering the labour market. Workers with less 
than 15 years of experience 
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Figure 4. Kernel densities of monthly and hourly wages by sex and type of contract when entering the labour market. Workers with more 
than 15 years of experience 
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In terms of hourly wages, we may note both similarities and differences between 
the samples of men and women. There are clear similarities with regard to the effect of 
entering the labour market with fixed-term contracts: in such cases both women and 
men – although the latter to a greater extent – are subject to a negative effect on the 
positioning of the pay density curve, which appears slightly more to the left compared 
to that of workers who start out with a permanent contract. Another similarity concerns 
the pay distribution for those who start out as self-employed: these workers present a 
greater (substantially so in the case of women) concentration of pay around the higher 
values. For women, in particular, beginning a career as self-employed would appear to 
guarantee higher earnings in the medium term. 
The major difference that emerges between the two sexes in the distribution of 
hourly pay concerns the contract positioning of para-subordinate work. As mentioned 
above, this type of employment renders the worker subordinate to an employer with 
regard to their duties and the way in which they are performed, albeit with a greater 
degree of autonomy compared to that of company employees. However, at an 
institutional level, with regard to welfare and social protection, these contracts are much 
more similar to self-employment than company employment posts. At least at a 
descriptive level, the distribution patterns of hourly pay show the financial advantage 
that such contract types may have for women in the medium term, as the distribution of 
hourly pay is clearly rightward of the distribution bells of those women with permanent 
or fixed-term contracts. This is not the case in the male sample. 
These results may indicate a non-random selection of the most skilled – and 
perhaps also best educated – women at the beginning of their working careers towards 
self-employment or para-subordinate work, which translates into being placed in a 
higher salary bracket in the shift to permanent work. On the other hand, they might be 
indicators of the skills or commitment of women who accept freelance-type work.  
 
 
4. Likelihood of job stabilisation and effects on earning of a flexible working 
career 
 
The results of the descriptive analysis given in the previous Sections encouraged us 
to move forward with an econometric summary in an attempt to provide a quantitative 
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assessment of what the effect of flexibility on employment and earnings outcomes is, 
and what the graphical analysis fails to detect. The interesting point to be explored 
further is whether the temporary nature of work and different forms of flexibility may 
have different effects on females and males. As noted in Section 3, in some cases the 
descriptive analysis shows a positive effect on earnings caused by flexibility, which 
could result from a selection effect; for example, the distributions of wages of female 
workers entering the labour market with para-subordinate work contracts and self-
employment positions are placed on higher values compared to the distribution of 
salaries of those entering the labour market as employees and this, as we said, could be 
due to a non-random selection of more skilled women in such contracts. 
We therefore propose an empirical model to estimate selection for permanent jobs 
and, at the same time, the hourly wages of workers who obtain those posts. The 
econometric model we use (Heckman, 1979) allows us to isolate any non-random 
selection of female and male workers in permanent jobs and at the same time, to 
achieve the dual aim of separating the analyses of access to stability and earnings. 
The Heckman model, applied to our context, consists of two equations: a selection 
equation to permanent and full-time employment – which is the first stage of the 
procedure – and an earnings equation for employees with this type of contract (second 
stage). 
According to Heckman (1979), the selection model for permanent work of the i-th 
individual belonging to group g (females/males) is the following: 
 
ggg igi
*
i uWz   with  2ui ggu 0,N~   females,malesg    (1) 
 
giW  represents the vector of the i-th individual’s characteristics belonging to group g, 
and g  represents the corresponding parameters. Since variable *igz  cannot be observed, 
the model is estimated on the dichotomous 
giz  variable, which assumes unitary value 
when the individual is working full-time with a permanent contract and null value on 
the contrary. The underline assumption is that 1z
gi   if 0z*ig   and 0z gi   if 0z*ig  . 
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The probability of the event “being employed with a permanent and full-time contract” 
is equal to )W()1z(obPr gii gg  . The probability of the null event is equal to 
)W(1)0z(obPr gii gg  . 
As for the second stage of the econometric model, hourly wages of permanent 
employees8 are expressed as in Equation 2: 
    
ggggggggg igfigiiigiiii XWu|EX1z,X|WE    (2) 
Wherever, for any i-th individual belonging to group g and in permanent employment, 
igW  is his/her observed wage rate (in logarithm), giX  his/her productive characteristics, 
g the rewards for those characteristics and gi  the error term,    
gfggg ugiugii
/W/W   is the inverse of the Mill’s ratio (as defined by 
Heckman) and is included in the earnings regression as an explicative variable. 
The model 1-2 is estimated for men and women separately through a two-stage 
procedure in which at the first stage Equation 1 is estimated, the Mill’s ratio derived and 
included as a regressor in the equation of hourly wages (second stage). 
 
Much of the role in explaining an individual’s wage rate is attributed to human 
capital characteristics, in particular education and experience. Therefore, Equation 2 is 
estimated including educational dummies among the regressors and two variables 
capturing the effect of human capital other than education: one for general experience 
and a second for firm-specific experience. General experience is computed as the total 
number of years spent working since the individual’s first significant employment, 
while firm-specific experience is proxied by the number of years spent with the same 
employer. The two are continuous variables and, as is generally assumed, enter the 
wage equation in quadratic form to capture their increasing effect, to a lesser extent, on 
wages. As for education, we categorise the variable in three different levels 
                                                 
8 From here onwards we refer to these workers only as “permanent workers”. 
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corresponding to primary school (the reference base in the estimates), upper stage of 
secondary education, and university.9  
The variables of interest for the purpose of this study are those that summarise the 
different aspects of flexibility, already discussed in earlier Sections, which have been 
translated into several dummies: those on the flexible characteristics of employment 
contracts when first entering the labour market and those on the number of company 
changes experienced by individuals during their professional careers. As for the periods 
of work interruption, we use all information available, and instead of estimating the 
only effect as having experienced periods of unemployment, we check for the causes of 
such interruptions, grouped as explained in Section 2.  
The empirical model is completed by the inclusion of dummies in occupational 
categories: firm size, sectors and macro-regions. In addition to that, two variables 
relating to domestic characteristics, such as whether the individual is married or 
cohabiting and the number of children, are included in the first-stage selection equation 
in order to identify second-stage coefficients.  
Estimated results for the most relevant variables can be found in Table 2, in which 
marginal effects are given for the first-stage equation. The complete table of estimated 
coefficients, at both stages, is to be found in the Appendix (Table A1). 
 
As for the marginal effects of the single variables on the likelihood of becoming a 
permanent worker, we note interesting differences between females and males. First of 
all, the probability of males becoming permanently employed increases significantly (by 
24%) when individuals complete the upper-stage of secondary education; on the 
contrary, that level of education is not enough to guarantee women a higher probability 
of permanent employment. Female workers have to reach a university degree in order to 
have a higher chance (by 15.6% compared to females with an education merely of the 
compulsory level) to be in the labour market permanently. On the other hand, among 
                                                 
9 The Italian educational system is made up of three levels of education. Compulsory schooling makes up 
a total of up to eight years, subdivided in two cycles: the first, up to five years of primary school (the so-
called “scuola elementare”) and the second, the three years of lower-secondary school (“scuola 
secondaria inferiore”). Individuals end the compulsory cycle, and decide whether to keep on studying 
when they are between 13 and 14 years old. If they decide to stay in school and enter the so-called upper 
stage of secondary education (“scuola secondaria superiore”), they can choose between different 
educational paths, some more technical-mathematical and other more humanistic. Whatever the case may 
be, if they complete the whole cycle of studies, they are allowed to enter university. 
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the other human capital variables, only “tenure” has a significant effect on permanency 
and, even in this case, the effect is much higher for men (almost 24% for men against 
6% for women).  
Turning to the marginal effects of the variables related to flexibility in employment, 
our results confirm some of the findings discussed in the literature; we may say that also 
in the case of Italian workers, be they men or women, flexibility on entering the labour 
market can negatively influence the likelihood of obtaining a permanent job. We see, in 
fact, that having experienced initial periods of work as a part-timer or fixed-term 
employee reduces the likelihood of gaining work permanency by 26% in the female 
case and around 37% in the male sample. This result is stunning, especially when 
compared to the (even greater) extent of the effect of first work experiences without any 
contract; in this case, penalisation in terms of the probability of obtaining a permanent 
job amounts to around 26% (for females) and 31% (for males).  
A medium-high mobility (equal to three or more job changes) during the professional 
career does not significantly reduce the female likelihood of reaching a permanent 
position. On the other hand, having been a highly mobile worker (six or more job 
changes), if male, positively affects the probability of having now become a permanent 
worker; the marginal effect is significant at a probability level of around 10% and 
amounts to around 20 percentage points with respect to the case of a mobility 
experienced of less than three job changes.  
As for the marginal effects incurred by significant periods of work interruption on 
the probability of having now been given a permanent position at present, we find 
significant evidence of a different pattern for men and women. In the case of work 
breaks due to WSF/Mobility/Unemployment and education, the penalisation is strongly 
higher for men: WSF/Mobility/Unemployment can account for a lower probability in 
accessing permanent work positions of around 35% for men and 15% for females; 
education marginally affects being given a permanent job by 57% and 43% in the male 
and female samples respectively. On the other hand, having interrupted work activity 
for care reasons or Illness/Maternity does not significantly affect the likelihood of men 
being permanently employed at the present, while has a significant negative effect for 
females, amounting to 11% and 27% respectively in the former and the latter case.  
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In general, we may say that flexibility penalises both men and women in accessing 
permanent job positions, although with different intensity and following distinct 
models.   
 
Turning now to the estimated results for hourly wages, an initial important outcome 
needs to be emphasised: the inverse of the Mill’s ratio plays a sharply different role in 
the two samples. More precisely, the female coefficient of the Mill’s ratio is strongly 
significant and assumes a positive sign; on the contrary, the male Mill’s ratio enters the 
equation with a weak significance and a negative coefficient. This outcome confirms 
some of the considerations we suggested in the previous Sections: the selection of 
females in permanent employment is positively biased, while selection of males is 
biased (at a lower significance level) towards slightly less skilled workers.  
Once corrected for selection, the estimated wages of permanent workers, either 
female or male, do not show a strong and significant penalisation due to flexibility. The 
only statistically significant negative effect is detected in relation to periods of 
interruptions due to WSF/Mobility/Unemployment experienced by male workers. In this 
case the hourly wage rate may suffer a penalisation around 5%. As for females, out of 
work periods due to illness reduce the wage rate by almost 10%, but with very weak 
significance. 
The econometric analysis reveals an interesting result as to the effect of mobility on 
the level of hourly wages: females, but not men, are rewarded more if they change jobs. 
In average terms (due to the regression procedure), hourly wages of females 
experiencing medium-high job mobility are higher compared to those having changed 
jobs a lower number of times: female hourly pays gain 3.5% if females have changed 
work between three and five times, and 9% if mobility is higher (six or more changes).  
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Table 2. Main estimation results 
 Selection equation Wage equation 
 Females Males Females Males 
 Marginal effects Marginal effects Coeff. Coeff. 
Human capital characteristics    
Upper-stage of 
secondary education 
0.048 0.241 0.200 0.060 
 (0.95) (2.78)** (9.04)** (3.80)** 
University education 0.156 0.191 0.341 0.222 
 (2.37)* (1.49) (12.28)** (9.08)** 
Experience 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.009 
 (0.57) (0.51) (2.44)* (3.42)** 
Experience squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.25) (0.96) (2.08)* (3.46)** 
Tenure 0.060 0.139 0.020 0.007 
 (9.29)** (10.62)** (5.87)** (2.49)* 
Tenure squared -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 
 (4.91)** (7.86)** (3.70)** (0.63) 
Flexibility when entering the labour market   
Fixed-term/part-time -0.262 -0.367 -0.041 -0.022 
 (4.07)** (3.28)** (1.37) (0.79) 
Self-employment -0.089 0.112 0.021 -0.036 
 (0.69) (0.56) (0.38) (1.02) 
Without contract -0.259 -0.307 -0.069 0.021 
 (2.64)** (1.96) (1.46) (0.54) 
Number of job changes   
3 to 5 0.025 0.068 0.036 0.011 
 (0.55) (0.82) (1.82) (0.73) 
6 or more -0.039 0.193 0.090 0.017 
 (0.50) (1.61) (2.53)* (0.66) 
Causes of career interruption   
Care -0.107 0.023 -0.017 -0.060 
 (2.29)* (0.04) (0.84) (0.43) 
WSF/Mobility- 
Unemployment 
-0.149 -0.353 -0.006 -0.052 
 (3.23)** (4.54)** (0.32) (2.91)** 
Illness/Maternity -0.270 0.002 -0.097 -0.035 
 (1.97)* (0.01) (1.67) (0.84) 
Education -0.427 -0.567 -0.052 0.043 
 (2.37)* (2.59)** (0.59) (0.65) 
Other -0.369 -0.276 -0.044 0.014 
 (3.73)** (1.64) (0.96) (0.37) 
Regional dummies    
North  -0.070 -0.020 -0.017 0.006 
 (1.54) (0.21) (0.93) (0.34) 
South 0.032 -0.153 -0.033 -0.000 
 (0.62) (1.52) (1.63) (0.01) 
Married/cohabiting -0.217 0.250   
 (-5.24)** (2.91)**   
Number of children -0.132 -0.003   
 (6.66)** (0.08)   
Constant -0.118 -0.001 1.450 1.879 
 (0.60) (0.00) (19.34)** (36.50)** 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio   0.142 -0.055 
   (3.485)** (1.86)* 
     
Number of 
observations 
3594 2469 3594 2469 
LR test of independent equations: Females’ model: chi2(1) = 8.12. Prob > chi2 = 0.0044.  
Males’ model: chi2(1) = 2.05. Prob > chi2 = 0.1518 
Absolute values of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper we studied the effect of flexibility on both wages and the likelihood of 
work stabilisation, by focusing on flexibility when entering the labour market and on 
periods of career interruption. Our main goal was to evaluate how having entered the 
labour market with fixed-term contracts or having experienced periods of interruption of 
work or many company changes can affect the likelihood of being given a permanent 
contract and the level of wages received in subsequent jobs. Unlike other works in the 
existing literature, this study has dealt with female and male workers separately.  
The descriptive analysis and the econometric results show the existence of gender 
differences in pay models with regard to both career mobility and flexibility in entering 
the labour market. In general, we may say that flexibility penalises both men and 
women in accessing permanent job positions, although with different intensity and 
following distinct models. In addition to that, selection of females in permanent 
employment is positively biased. 
Estimates confirm some of the findings discussed in the literature and highlight 
new facts as to gender differences. Flexibility on entering the labour market can 
negatively influence the likelihood of obtaining a permanent job, for both men and 
women; on the other hand, having experienced a medium-high mobility during the 
professional career does not significantly reduce female likelihood of reaching a 
permanent position, while positively affects the probability of having become a 
permanent worker, if male. As to having experienced significant periods of work 
interruption, we find that in the case of work breaks due to unemployment – either 
subsidised or not – the penalisation in terms of probability to reach a permanent position 
is strongly higher for men than for women; the opposite is true when work interruptions 
occur for care reasons, illness or maternity.  
Once corrected for selection, the estimated wages of permanent workers, either 
female or male, do not show a strong and significant penalisation due to flexibility. The 
only statistically significant negative effect is detected in relation to periods of 
interruptions due to WSF/Mobility/Unemployment experienced by male workers and 
out of work periods due to illness experienced by females. An interesting result has to 
be mentioned in relation to the effect of mobility on the level of hourly wages: females, 
but not men, are rewarded more if they change jobs. In average terms, hourly wages of 
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females experiencing medium-high job mobility are higher compared to those having 
changed jobs a lower number of times. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Kernel densities of hourly wages by sex, age and number of job changes 
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Table A1. Estimation results 
 Females Males 
 Selection 
equation Wage equation 
Selection 
equation Wage equation 
Human capital     
Upper-stage of secondary 
education 
0.067 0.200 0.299 0.060 
 (0.95) (9.04)** (2.78)** (3.80)** 
University education 0.218 0.341 0.237 0.222 
 (2.37)* (12.28)** (1.49) (9.08)** 
Experience 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.009 
 (0.57) (2.44)* (0.51) (3.42)** 
Experience squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.25) (2.08)* (0.96) (3.46)** 
Tenure 0.084 0.020 0.173 0.007 
 (9.29)** (5.87)** (10.62)** (2.49)* 
Tenure squared -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 
 (4.91)** (3.70)** (7.86)** (0.63) 
Flexibility when entering the labour market   
Fixed-term/part-time -0.366 -0.041 -0.455 -0.022 
 (4.07)** (1.37) (3.28)** (0.79) 
Self-employment -0.124 0.021 0.138 -0.036 
 (0.69) (0.38) (0.56) (1.02) 
Withount contract -0.362 -0.069 -0.381 0.021 
 (2.64)** (1.46) (1.96) (0.54) 
Number of job changes   
3 to 5 0.035 0.036 0.085 0.011 
 (0.55) (1.82) (0.82) (0.73) 
6 or more -0.054 0.090 0.239 0.017 
 (0.50) (2.53)* (1.61) (0.66) 
Causes of career interruption    
Care -0.149 -0.017 0.028 -0.060 
 (2.29)* (0.84) (0.04) (0.43) 
WSF/Mobility/ 
Unemployment 
-0.208 -0.006 -0.438 -0.052 
 (3.23)** (0.32) (4.54)** (2.91)** 
Illness(Maternity -0.377 -0.097 0.002 -0.035 
 (1.97)* (1.67) (0.01) (0.84) 
Education -0.596 -0.052 -0.706 0.043 
 (2.37)* (0.59) (2.59)** (0.65) 
Other -0.515 -0.044 -0.342 0.014 
 (3.73)** (0.96) (1.64) (0.37) 
Occupational types     
Manager 0.619 0.230 1.053 0.296 
 (2.59)** (4.39)** (2.26)* (7.39)** 
Intellectual professions 0.247 0.295 0.774 0.337 
 (1.53) (6.37)** (2.51)* (8.26)** 
Teacher 0.136 0.277 0.053 0.501 
 (1.30) (10.03)** (0.20) (10.15)** 
White-collar 0.072 -0.073 0.123 -0.015 
 (0.95) (2.93)** (0.86) (0.66) 
Qualified blue-collar 0.283 -0.113 0.197 -0.113 
 (1.85) (2.44)* (1.25) (4.45)** 
Blue-collar 0.264 -0.131 0.106 -0.115 
 (2.40)* (3.59)** (0.70) (4.44)** 
Technical professions 0.341 0.007 0.087 0.009 
 (2.96)** (0.19) (0.53) (0.33) 
Sectors     
Energy 0.381 0.214 -0.090 0.039 
 (0.75) (1.90) (0.20) (0.86) 
Mining -0.338 -0.103 -0.222 0.053 
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 (0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.74) 
Food -0.312 -0.101 -0.454 -0.064 
 (1.61) (1.71) (1.76) (1.47) 
Textiles 0.076 0.005 0.081 -0.110 
 (0.47) (0.11) (0.25) (2.73)** 
Wood 0.162 -0.037 -0.289 -0.012 
 (0.42) (0.37) (0.81) (0.21) 
Paper -0.222 -0.211 0.053 -0.054 
 (0.68) (2.20)* (0.11) (1.06) 
Refinery 4.681 0.404 6.836 0.077 
 (0.00) (1.31) (0.00) (0.72) 
Chemicals 0.416 0.092 -0.324 0.004 
 (1.52) (1.44) (1.33) (0.09) 
Plastic -0.294 -0.090 -0.261 -0.063 
 (1.04) (1.08) (0.76) (1.14) 
Mineral sector -0.685 0.089 0.274 0.032 
 (1.42) (0.58) (0.43) (0.49) 
Electrics -0.273 -0.071 -0.212 0.009 
 (1.17) (1.02) (0.85) (0.26) 
Automotive 0.083 0.021 0.176 0.011 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.37) (0.20) 
Other manufacturing 0.048 -0.017 -0.123 -0.075 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.32) (1.29) 
Construction -0.258 0.005 0.152 0.021 
 (1.01) (0.06) (0.75) (0.65) 
Transport 0.111 -0.057 -0.407 0.057 
 (0.56) (1.09) (2.12)* (1.96)* 
Retailing -0.470 -0.112 -0.064 -0.057 
 (3.39)** (2.64)** (0.34) (2.02)* 
Hotel -0.870 -0.333 -1.527 -0.237 
 (4.69)** (4.54)** (4.89)** (2.91)** 
Financial -0.203 0.101 -0.277 0.175 
 (1.29) (2.24)* (1.09) (5.49)** 
Real estate -0.399 -0.104 0.017 -0.047 
 (2.67)** (2.24)* (0.07) (1.45) 
Public dministration 0.056 -0.028 -0.291 -0.002 
 (0.39) (0.74) (1.57) (0.09) 
Education 0.182 0.132 -0.908 -0.081 
 (1.30) (3.27)** (3.80)** (1.99)* 
Health -0.228 -0.010 -0.506 -0.020 
 (1.62) (0.26) (2.33)* (0.62) 
International organisations 4.563 0.433 -0.240 0.313 
 (0.00) (1.96) (0.23) (1.13) 
Other services -0.426 -0.111 -0.677 -0.055 
 (2.98)** (2.50)* (3.68)** (1.70) 
Firm size     
10 to 19 employees 0.214 0.079 0.281 -0.005 
 (2.68)** (3.10)** (1.83) (0.22) 
20 to 49 0.213 0.130 0.034 0.048 
 (2.76)** (5.32)** (0.25) (2.09)* 
50 to 249 0.240 0.138 0.131 0.070 
 (3.40)** (6.06)** (1.06) (3.39)** 
250 to 499 0.210 0.139 -0.017 0.071 
 (1.81) (4.12)** (0.10) (2.65)** 
500 or more 0.358 0.159 0.321 0.071 
 (4.32)** (6.23)** (2.15)* (3.29)** 
Regional dummies     
North -0.098 -0.017 -0.025 0.006 
 (1.54) (0.93) (0.21) (0.34) 
South 0.045 -0.033 -0.189 -0.000 
 (0.62) (1.63) (1.52) (0.01) 
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Family’s characteristics     
Married/cohabiting -0.303  0.310  
 (-5.24)**  (2.91)**  
Number of children -0.184  -0.004  
 (6.66)**  (0.08)  
Constant -0.118 1.450 -0.001 1.879 
 (0.60) (19.34)** (0.00) (36.50)** 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio  0.142  -0.055 
  (3.485)**  (1.86)* 
Number of observations 3594 3594 2469 2469 
Absolute values of z statistics in parentheses. * ignificant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
